This study examines whether private financing erodes public support for maintaining health care budgets in the public sector. It also examines the hypothesis that private financing reduces the real value of nominal government health care budgets by contributing to higher health care costs. The statistical analysis focuses on a set of OECD countries for the 1980s. The results provide little support for arguments that private financing of health care contributes to reduced access to publicly financed health care. Rather, they lend support to the view that restricting the availability of private health care financing will erode support for public plans that are operating with excess demand. Moreover, results with respect to health care costs are sensitive to the inclusion of the United States in the model.
INTRODUCTION
Virtually all developed countries rely predominantly upon public sources to finance health care. In most of these countries, health funding is derived from income taxes and payroll taxes, as well as social security contributions. However, as governments have come under increasing pressure to reduce budget deficits and face increasing opposition to raising tax rates, private "cost-sharing" has grown. Private financing can take the form of user fees, higher deductions and copayments for public insurance, as well as private insurance. 1 The recent increase in the importance of private funding has been criticized on both philosophical and economic grounds, (see Evans, et. al., 1989; Mhatre and Deber, Steven Globerman is Ross Professor of Canada-U.S. Business and Economic Relations at Western Washington University. Aidan Vining is Professor of Public Policy and Business Strategy at Simon Fraser University.
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1 For a discussion of cost sharing and its different forms, see Swartz (1993). 1992). Perhaps the most serious criticism is that the growth of private financing jeopardizes equivalent access to health care across individuals with different income levels. Prominent exponents of this argument are the Canadian government health care officials who cite access concerns as justification for policies discouraging private financing alternatives to Medicare. 2 Concerns about increased private funding requirements for Medicare have also been featured in U.S. debates. Some opponents of initiatives that would reduce public funding to wealthier Medicare beneficiaries argue that any restrictions will inevitably lead to fewer services being provided to less wealthy beneficiaries by the publicly funded system. Thus, if wealthier older Americans are required to buy supplementary private insurance or pay more out-of-pocket, poorer older Americans will be budget-constrained into accepting less health care.
Given these concerns, the purpose of this study is to evaluate the relationship between sources of health care financing and access to health care; in particular, whether increased private financing affects the provision of publicly financed health care. The next section overviews the relationship between private financing and access to health care by lower-income individuals. Then, a more detailed evaluation of the issues and empirical tests of the critical relationships are followed by a presentation of statistical results of the empirical tests. Finally, we offer conclusions and some policy implications.
THE POLICY CONTEXT
Private insurers set premiums on the basis of individual or group risk characteristics. Only two countries, the United States and Switzerland, have private insurance that cover major health care risks for the bulk of the population. However, in Switzerland, private insurers are heavily regulated and required to provide community rather than individual risk rating (OECD, 1995) . In most other countries, private schemes complement public schemes at the margin. Typically, supplementary private schemes insure against copayments and user charges not covered under the public plan or insure services or risks, not covered by state schemes.
The two main types of public plans are social insurance systems and taxfinanced systems. Social insurance systems are based on statutory sickness funds that are overseen and tightly regulated by government. Risks are pooled in the fund, and premiums are income-related over some range. Membership is compulsory for certain groups, for example, those with lower incomes, and, in some cases, cover the entire population. In tax-financed schemes, the state 2 Such policies include prohibitions against operators of private clinics collecting any part of their fees under Medicare. Another is the restriction against service providers charging their patients more than the fees negotiated between provincial governments and service providers.
finances health care as part of its budget. Provision can be delegated to lower levels of government or to (usually) non-profit suppliers (OECD, 1995, p.22) .
Although public sector health provision dominates in almost all developed countries, private insurance plays a significant role in most countries. The data presented in Table 1 show both health expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and public health expenditures as a percentage of total health expenditures for OECD countries in 1992. Substantial differences exist in the public sector's share of total health care expenditures. It is common to criticize initiatives that plan to reduce government health care spending as encouraging a "two-tier" health system, where those who can afford private financing alternatives are "well-served," while those who cannot are "poorly served." The different attributes of the two tiers usually are not articulated, although presumably the well-served will have more timely access to a wider range of higher quality services.
In fact, since the quality of medical services can be regulated to ensure that minimal standards of competence are maintained, the main issue would appear to be the timeliness and scope of access that the wealthy would enjoy relative to the poor. 3 Any differences in the timeliness and scope of access by income level would violate a strict egalitarian criterion. 4 The critical issue is what, if anything, changes when private financing increases relative to total financing? In particular, will real levels of public financing for health care services decline? A ubiquitous argument is that public support for publicly funded health care will be eroded by any growth of private financing. A related argument is that the proliferation of privately financed health care schemes will lead to higher prices for factor inputs, thereby leading to lower levels of real health care output, given fixed nominal government health care budgets (Besley and Gouveia, 1994; Globerman and Vining, 1996) .
The linkages between the relative amount of privately financed health care and the real value of public health care budgets have not been integrated into a unified analysis. Nor, in our opinion, have they been subjected to satisfactory empirical testing. The next two sections attempt to address these shortcomings.
PRIVATE FINANCING AND ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE
First, we provide a simple framework for analyzing government health care budgets. We assume that society can be divided into two groups: wealthy (WI) and poor (PI) individuals. 5 We also assume that health care services are 3 This is not to deny that medical services purchased by the wealthy could have more desirable attributes than those purchased by the poor, including amenities that reduce the discomfort associated with receiving treatment; however, most government appear willing to tolerate such differences (such as extra charges for private rooms in hospitals) as long as the differences do not contribute significantly to differences in the outcomes of treatments.
4 The practical relevance of this concern may be small. For one thing, wealthy individuals cannot be prevented from acquiring health care in an increasingly international market (OECD, 1994) . For another, equal de jure access is not equivalent to equal de facto access. For example, government-sponsored health care programs in the United States do not result in similar rates of utilization of health care services across groups in society (Hayward et. Al., 1988; Currie and Thomas, 1995) . However, these refutations of the practical relevance of an egalitarian criterion do not directly address the concern that, in the absence of policies to curtail private funding, differential access based on income levels will become more pronounced. 5 This dichotomy implies nothing about absolute wealth or income. Specifically, PI is assumed to include most middle-income individuals.
represented as a homogeneous output (Qh). 6 The real value of the public health care budget is established by: the nominal budget, which itself is the outcome of a political process; factor prices facing the public insurance scheme; and the efficiency with which the public scheme can purchase health care for its members. The demand for health care (Qhd) is assumed to be independent of the supply of health care (Qhs), allowing a focus on the supply determinants. Furthermore, it is assumed that there can be excess demand for health care, which is either rationed by waiting for publicly, financed care or which gives rise to privately financed health care.
The supply of publicly financed health care (Qps) is summarized as
where B = the nominal value of the public budget, Pi = a vector of prices for inputs used in the production of health care for the public plan, and E = an index of efficiency for the public plan. 7 We hypothesize that supply is positively related to B and E and negatively related to Pi. Consumption of health care is rivalrous between WI and PI so that any given value of Qps is exhausted by the additive demand of wealthy and poor individuals. Hence, if WI collectively utilize less publicly financed health care, there is more Qps available for PI. Alternatively, if there is overall excess demand, less consumption by WI means PI will face shorter waiting times. Thus,
where dQps(PI) = the change in publicly financed health care supplied to PI, dQps = the change in the total supply of publicly financed health care, and dQps(WI) is the change in publicly-financed health care supplied to WI. Assuming that WI are imperfectly satisfied with publicly-financed health care at current prices, the direct effect of an increase in the supply of private financing through premiums or taxes, there is no direct substitution possible between public and private plans. A relevant issue then becomes whether and how indirect substitution might take place. If no indirect substitution is possible, 6 Obviously, this assumption is somewhat unrealistic. Moreover, wealthier and poorer individuals differ in the basket of health care services they consume. Nevertheless, the main points identified in our framework are unaffected by assuming that health care is a homogenous commodity. Important conceptual issues are associated with the identification of health care supply and demand functions. Our empirical analysis assumes that health care expenditures reflect the interaction of relevant supply and demand curves; however, since we are not interested in the identification of either the supply or demand curve, per se, we do not address identification issues in this paper.
7 The E variable plays no direct role in our empirical analysis; however, we do model cost increases in the health care sector which will, in part, reflect efficiency changes.
then a negative value for dQps(WI), with dQps = 0, implies a positive value for dQps(PI).
PRIVATE FINANCING AND FACTOR PRICES
As noted earlier, one possible consequence of private financing is that increased competition between private and public insurance schemes could erode the monopsonistic purchasing power of the public plan. This presumes that the government insurer successfully exercises monopsony power. For example, there is some evidence that the British National Health Service, in its early years, used its monopsony power in bargaining with professional health care suppliers (Digby and Bosanquet, 1988; Reekie, 1995) . Similarly, there is evidence that Canadian provinces that were early implementers of government insurance experienced lower subsequent increases in factor prices than other provinces (Taylor, 1987) . However, the relevance of monopsony power as an argument for constraining the growth of private financing is questionable for at least two reasons. First, monopsony power will diminish over time as the supply elasticities of factor inputs increase. Indeed, for inputs that are highly elastic in supply, even a single buyer will have little opportunity to extract "rent." 8 For example, Reekie (1995) shows that, in recent years, the British National Health Service has had to increase payments to physicians at rates above inflation to encourage students to study medicine and to discourage the emigration of domestically trained physicians. 9 Second, lower prices paid to factor inputs by the government plan may reflect the greater certainty associated with contracting with the public plan. There is, typically, greater certainty in terms of receiving payment, since governments are less likely to default than are private organizations. There is also likely to be less "patient churning," since patients in public plans generally have less ability to change physicians than those buying care in the private sector. 10 If these are the causes of the lower observed factor prices paid by public plans, they have little to do with monopsony power. Rather, the underlying causes are the 8 To be sure, governments can also restrict the growth of health care inputs. While this will make the supply curves for these inputs more inelastic, it will also reduce supply increases which puts upward pressure on factor prices.
9 Rivers-Mobley (1992) notes the possibility that competition among insurers encourages a more intensive search for ways to substitute lower-priced inputs for higherpriced inputs. Specifically, she concludes that increased competition in California's health insurance market probably contributed to substantial price competition among hospitals, reflected in relatively high contracting-out of services. 10 This is a relative matter. For example, HMOs and other group providers in the United States are increasingly circumscribing their patients' choices of physicians. In some public insurance schemes, such as Canada's Medicare Plan, patients are relatively free to choose among general practitioners. However, even Canadian-style public insurance schemes are generally quite restrictive of patient choice of specialist physicians.
lower cost of public capital and the more limited choice for consumers under publicly financed schemes.
Private Financing and Its Potential Impacts on Efficiency of Publicly Financed Health Care
Privately financed health care may have a number of potential impacts on the efficiency of publicly financed health care. One common argument is that it will lead to the attenuation of economies of scale that would be enjoyed by a single payer or a small number of payers. These economies of scale are usually associated with declining unit costs of administration (Evans et. al., 1989) . The evidence clearly supports the existence of economies in administration (Fuchs and Hahn, 1990; Evans, et. al., 1989) . While the most dramatic evidence draws upon comparisons between the highly fragmented U.S. private insurance system and the single-payer Canadian public system, other Canadian evidence is also relevant. Namely, comparisons between government and private insurers in the early years of provincial government insurance schemes showed that administration costs as a share of premium revenue were significantly higher for private insurance (Taylor, 1987) . Obviously, both levels and changes in overall efficiency reflect broader considerations than simply administrative economies of scale. There are numerous ways in which the overall efficiency of the public plan could be affected by the presence of private insurance options. For example, private insurers might be more innovative than the public plan. In turn, public plans might be receptive to adopting cost-saving innovations once private insurers have introduced those innovations. Hence, the presence of private insurers might stimulate the diffusion of innovations in the public sector.
Potential efficiency improvements are also related to the possibility of public managers "benchmarking" the cost performance of their plan to private insurance plans. Conversely, to the extent that public and private sector insurers share the use of institutions and service suppliers, the public plan faces additional administrative costs associated with pricing the use of facilities and inputs that are primarily used to service publicly-insured patients. 11 Very little empirical evidence documents the impacts of the presence of private financing on the overall efficiency of public plans. Some indirect, but suggestive, evidence is provided by the experience of Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans in the United States that compete with commercial insurers and HMOs. The Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans can be viewed as quasi-public insurance plans. They are non-profit organizations that traditionally have received favorable tax treatment and related benefits from government in return for abstaining from setting risk-related premiums and from excluding applicants based on prior conditions. Using a cross-section of various plans for 1978 including Blue 11 Ongoing consolidation of hospitals and health insurers in the United States is presumably reducing the administrative cost component of health care premiums.
Cross/Blue Shield, Hay and Leahy (1984) found that competition between plans reduces health care expenditures and hospital utilization rates. 12 Conversely, the experiences reported for New Zealand and South Africa suggest that temporary shortages of physicians and nurses caused by their being "bid away" by private payers created inefficiencies for the public plan by making it more difficult to utilize capacity at planned rates (Globerman and Vining, 1996) .
PRIVATE FINANCING AND NOMINAL PUBLIC HEALTH CARE BUDGETS
A substantial literature on the public provision of private goods that helps identify the nature of the potential substitution between public and private financing of health care (Arrow, 1971; Usher, 1977; Besley and Coate, 1991 ). Society's choice of public versus private financing is conditioned by a potential tradeoff between redistribution and service heterogeneity. Specifically, public provision of services tends to redistribute income from the wealthier to the middle and lower income groups. Given the larger number of lower and middle income voters who would normally benefit from redistributive policies, public provision of services would dominate in voting processes, ceteris paribus; that is, the median voter would normally favor redistribution policies. However, public provision also tends to be characterized by greater homogeneity of output than would be true under a private provision regime. Given differences in preferences, voters would favor private supply of health services, ceteris paribus.
The "median voter" model links these concepts in an equilibrium framework (Holcombe, 1989; Turnbull and Mitias, 1996) . In voting models, voters assess whether their interests are better served, on the margin, by more redistribution or more service heterogeneity. In the context of health care, the redistribution motive is likely to dominate, although the likelihood is, perhaps, weaker than some observers have asserted. Besley and Gouveia (1994) , for example, note that health care is consumed at one time or another by virtually everyone, and that differences in utilization by income levels for insured patients are relatively modest. 13 Moreover, since physicians strongly influence many health care consumption decisions, while medical practices are fairly standardized, diversity in tastes (which would discourage publicly financed medicine if sufficiently pronounced) is unlikely to be substantial. Nevertheless, the Rand Health Insurance experiment suggests that individuals as patients are decision-makers for a significant volume of care (Newhouse, 1993) . Significant variations in medical 12 This study corrects for biases in earlier studies which found that HMO growth induces Blue Cross plans to reduce hospital utilization in those areas where the HMO has the largest market share but does not contribute to lower hospital costs. Relevant studies here include Greenberg (1980, 1981) .
13 Utilization of physicians' services among insured individuals does show some variation by race (Currie and Thomas, 1995) .
practices within and across geographic regions also have been documented (Phelps, 1992; Miller, Holahan, and Welch, 1995) . The implication of the voting literature is that even very strong lobbying on the part of wealthier individuals, who presumably have easier access to private payment options, may not lead to reductions in public health care budgets, all other things being equal. The strong interest of the median voter toward redistribution should ensure a powerful voting bloc in favor of maintaining public health care spending budgets under most plausible circumstances. The empirical median voter literature is consistent with this belief (Holcombe, 1980; Denzau and Grier, 1984; Congleton and Bennett, 1995) . 14 This certainly seems to have been the case in Britain, where the government encouraged private participants during the 1980s. Except for certain services such as psychiatric hospitals, demand for privately insured services has remained quite limited (Rayner, 1987; Higgins, 1990; Nemes, 1991) .
The median voter model also can be broadened to reflect non -voting lobbying influences. Here, however, the implications probably run in the other direction. If the wealthier receive less of their health care through the public system, their commitment to preserve the public system can be expected to diminish. Indeed, the "tax wedge" between what they pay for public health care and what they receive presumably grows as they buy more health care privately. Wealthier individuals would presumably be willing to spend virtually this entire wedge lobbying for lower taxes knowing that a substantial share of taxes fund health care. Thus, the growth of the private system might make the wealthier a stronger and more cohesive force for lower taxes to fund the public scheme. In short, it is possible to posit a model where increased private financing leads to reductions in nominal government health care budgets; notwithstanding the strong redistributive nature of public health care systems.
In contrast, it is also possible to describe a variation of the model where government attempts to suppress the growth of private financing lead to reductions in nominal public health care budgets. If waiting became fairly widespread throughout health care, a potential dimension of service heterogeneity is introduced: speed and reliability of obtaining treatment. The promise of faster and more reliable delivery of services could be a robust means for private insurers to differentiate themselves from the public plan. One would expect wealthier individuals, with higher opportunity costs, to have high demand for prompter service. Although poorer individuals have a lower opportunity cost of time than wealthier individuals, reduced waiting and more reliable and predictable treatment scheduling are normal goods for them also. A suppression of private financing generates longer waiting lists for the public plan in the presence of 14 Obviously, if wealthier voters can simply opt out of financially supporting the public system, the issue is more complicated. Presumably, if opting out did threaten public health care budgets, public pressure would be generated for directly or indirectly taxing private health care benefit packages. excess demand for health care. As waiting lists grow, some less wealthy individuals may value the diversification benefits of some private insurance more highly than the redistribution benefits of a universal public plan. 15 The "equilibrium" solution of such a process is unclear, although the direction of change is toward smaller nominal public budgets, as a critical coalition of voters dissatisfied with service provision under the public plan is established. However, it is unlikely that public financing and provision would be eliminated entirely. For one thing, poorer individuals considering voting for tax reductions will recognize that this may cause spending reductions for the public scheme. This, in turn, means lower income individuals can expect less redistribution in the future.
Their expected benefits of greater service heterogeneity would therefore be weighed against the costs of lower real incomes, where real incomes include access to and consumption of health care services.
The relative valuation of publicly versus privately financed health care, at the margin, should depend upon the relative quantity of publicly financed health care. In particular, the value of "core" publicly financed procedures to the median voter (who is in PI) should be larger, at the margin, the smaller the core, presuming that inframarginal publicly financed services are, in fact, medically important. Likewise, diminishing returns to altruism (Margolis, 1982) suggest that the willingness of wealthier individuals (who are in WI) to fund the access of poorer individuals is reduced beyond a core set of medically important procedures.
In sum, attempts by government to suppress private financing might actually lead to lower nominal public budgets. "Successful" suppression implies that waiting list pressures and related costs would not be reduced, and it is waiting at the margin that encourages poorer individuals to prefer the increased heterogeneity provided by private insurance to the redistribution provided by public insurance. Hence, if waiting and related costs became sufficiently onerous, a significant number of poorer individuals might defect to a coalition of wealthier individuals to lobby for lower government health care taxes in order to fund private financing options. 16 Successful coalitions are unlikely to support the complete or even substantial replacement of the public scheme by private sources, even given relatively high costs of waiting, since the benefits of redistribution are likely to outweigh the costs of waiting as the scope of core public services shrink. The continued dominance of publicly financed schemes in the United Kingdom and Canada, where waiting lists for medical treatments have, at times, been quite 15 Evidence from the United Kingdom suggests that the demand for privately financed health care is directly related to the length of waiting lists. At all income levels, use of privately financed health care rose and fell according to the length of waiting lists (Besley, Hall, and Preston, 1996) .
16 Obviously, absolutely poor individuals would find it difficult to buy private insurance or to self-insure. The "poorer" in our dichotomous model can include many middle-income voters who are presumably able to purchase some forms of private insurance, perhaps covering fairly basic levels of care.
substantial, supports this claim. For example, evidence from the United Kingdom shows relatively small differences between those with private insurance and those without in terms of their overall satisfaction with the National Health Services 17 (Besley, Hall, and Preston, 1996, p.23 ). However, a completely uncompromising attitude toward allowing private financing by government might lead to the elimination of the public plan. 18 Suppose that a government was prepared to go to any (successful) lengths to prevent the growth of private financing. An increasing number of individuals might come to see the very existence of the public scheme as threatening their ability to receive timely treatment for conditions that are of most concern to them, at the margin. In this case, even poorer individuals might be willing to assume full financial responsibilities for health care for the marginal (but highly valued) diversification benefits that they would realize. That is, they might join a coalition prepared to vote for the elimination of the public plan. Public policy would, in effect, impose an indivisible choice on voters-that is, either enjoy heterogeneity or forego redistribution.
As the data presented in Table 1 suggest, the general pattern is for countries to have minority private financing. Clearly, most governments have been willing to tolerate some "safety-valve" measure of private financing. The empirical issue is whether further increases would lead to significant changes in the level of public financing. We now turn to a consideration of this issue.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
This section provides some evidence on the relationship between funding mix and nominal public health care budgets and between funding mix and medical price inflation. Before doing so, it is useful to present some background data. The data presented in Table 2 show public health expenditures as a percentage of total health expenditures for two base years, along with the change (in percentage points) over two time periods. Public health expenditures as a percentage of total public. expenditures are shown for the same base years, and the change (in percentage points) is shown for the period 1981through 1990. Virtually all studies examining the impact of source of financing on health care expenditures focus on per capita health care expenditures, or health expenditures as a percent of GDP (i.e., column one in Table 1 ), as the dependent variable. The virtually uniform conclusion is that a higher share of public financing in total financing is associated with lower expenditures as a percent of GDP. The obvious 17 It should be pointed out, however, that the privately insured are less likely to favor increased spending on the National Health Service (Besley, Hall, and Preston, 1996.p.38) .
18 The fact that governments, including the British government, have tolerated significant increases in private financing suggests that they see private financing as a necessary safety valve for public dissatisfaction with declining service levels in the public system (Higgins, 1990). interpretation is that public insurers are able to control health care expenditures better than private insurers. 19 This putative relationship is illustrated by the simple correlation coefficient between the two columns in Table 1 . This correlation equals -0.41, which is significantly different from zero at the .05 level. 20 While it would seem that higher relative levels of public financing are associated with reduced overall expenditures on health care, this does not directly inform the question of whether the private-public financing mix affects the public sector's financial commitment to health care. In this regard, standardizing public health care expenditures by GDP may be an inappropriate measure of government's financial commitment to health. Countries at comparable income levels face different public sector budgetary pressures. To the extent that a government cuts health expenditures relatively more than other public expenditures, we would argue that support for public health care is relatively weak. Conversely, if a government facing budgetary pressure to cut overall spending increases its share of budget spent on health care, we would argue that support for public health care is relatively strong.
Thus, a robust test of the hypothesis that the share of private health care financing affects government health care budgets must focus on how much government spends on health care relative to other services. A higher ratio would indicate greater support for maintaining the size of the public health care system. The choice of this measure might lead to different results than using health expenditures as a share of GDP.
For a sample of 23 OECD countries (excluding Turkey) for 1980, the simple correlation between health expenditures as a share of GDP and public health care expenditures as a share of total government expenditures is essentially zero (i.e., -0.015). Given this lack of correlation, the chosen measure of "public financing support" for health care is important. In the first part of the empirical analysis, the relationship of interest is between the mix of health care financing and public health care expenditures as a share of total government expenditures. The two main samples and the variables used in the regressions are defined in Table 3 . All empirical results are reported in Table 4 . The underlying data for the empirical results are reported in Table 5 .
Discussion of Equation (1) from Table 4
As an initial test of the hypothesis that higher ratios of private to total health care financing lead to subsequent decreases (or slower growth) in the ratio of public health care expenditures to total government expenditures, we define the variable MIX to be public health expenditures as a percentage of total health expenditures for 1980. Since the appropriate lag between funding mix and subsequent government expenditure changes is uncertain, a variety of earlier period values of the funding variable were tried, including the average value of the statistic for the years 1980 and 1990. In fact, it made little difference whether the 1980 value was 20 The correlation coefficient is not significantly different from zero after deleting the United States from the sample. We elaborate upon this point when discussing our regression results focusing on health care specific inflation rates. used or whether averages of values covering different spans of years during the 1980s were used. 21 (Cutler and Gruber, 1996) . However, specifying the ratio of public to total health care financing as a "beginning period" value (MIX) mitigates this possibility. In effect, we are testing for a lagged influence of financing mix on support for publicly funded health care. 
The dependent variable, GRO, is defined as the absolute increase (in percentage points) in public health care expenditures as a percent of total government expenditures over the period 1981through 1990. Support for the hypothesis that higher levels of private financing erode future support for publicly funded health care would be provided by a positive coefficient for the MIX variable in a regression of GRO on MIX. The ordinary least square regression of GRO on MIX is reported as equation (1). 22 The MIX coefficient is negative, but it is statistically insignificant using a two-tailed test. The F ratio is statistically significant at the .05 level. Since no significant differences in the regression results were detected using alternative definitions of the MIX variable, the 1980 value for the variable is used in all reported estimations. Table 4 Other variables were included to control for influences on GRO that are not orthogonal to the MIX variable. EXCESS is defined as the country's publicly funded expenditures on health care as a percent of total government expenditures in 1981 minus the average of all OECD countries for that variable. EXCESS measures the relative size of the publicly funded health care sector in 1981. Two interpretations of this variable are possible. One is that relatively high EXCESS values reflect greater public support for public health care relative to other government expenditures, perhaps reflecting, in turn, a superior relative performance of the health sector. An alternative interpretation, among others, is that relatively high values of EXCESS reflect higher levels of public health spending, but without any higher quality; in this interpretation, higher values of EXCESS do not suggest strong public support for publicly financed health care. Indeed, a high value of EXCESS might be consistent with suppressed demand for more privately financed health care. 23 Unfortunately, either interpretation of EXCESS is consistent with a positive coefficient.
Discussion of Equation (2) in
To the extent that the income elasticity of demand for health care is higher than the average for other government services, increases in national income per capita could lead to higher values of GRO, thereby confounding an interpretation of higher values of the dependent variable as reflecting greater public support for publicly funded health care associated with variations in the MIX variable. In fact,, this potential problem may not be quantitatively important, since the income elasticity of demand for health care has been found to be slightly greater than unity in time series studies (Phelps, 1992) , while empirical studies using estimates of permanent income find the income elasticity of overall government 22 The sample consisted of 21 OECD countries. Luxembourg, New Zealand, and Turkey were excluded because of insufficient data to calculate GRO.
23 One possible reason for higher values of EXCESS under this latter interpretation is that suppliers of health care inputs are paid supracompetitive prices, perhaps associated with restrictions on supply.
expenditures to be around unity (Peltzman, 1980; Ferris and West, 1996) . Nevertheless, it is useful to include in the estimated equation the variable INGRO, measured as the growth in gross national expenditures relative to the population between 1980 and 1990. 24 Greater ratios of physicians and health care employees in the population can be expected to contribute to a strong lobby for larger government expenditures on health care. The variable PHYS is defined as the number of practicing physicians per 1,000 residents in 1981. The variable EMP is defined as health employment as a percentage of total employment in 1981. We also include the variable AGE, specified as the percentage of the 1980 population aged 65 and over, as a measure of lobbying pressure for increased government health care expenditures, as the elderly are disproportionate users of health care services. Clearly, the PHYS, EMP, and AGE variables can be interpreted only as rough proxies for health care expenditure lobbying pressure, since lobbying effectiveness might depend upon other (unmeasurable) characteristics, such as the autonomy and cohesiveness of the specific interest groups.
It is possible that MIX and EXCESS exert an interactive influence on GRO. For example, if higher values for EXCESS reflect greater satisfaction with the publicly funded system and, therefore, greater public demand for governments to spend money on health care relative to other services, the interaction term is likely to be positive, since a higher ratio of EXCESS conditions the MIX variable to have a larger positive coefficient. Alternatively, if EXCESS primarily reflects the influence of relatively strong bargaining power exercised by the suppliers of health care inputs, there is no presumption that higher values of EXCESS reflect greater demands for health care delivered by the public plan, as discussed above. In this case, one might observe no significant relationship between GRO and INT, or even (perhaps) a negative one. An interaction variable (INT) defined as the product of MIX and EXCESS is therefore included in the estimating equation.
The estimation results are reported in equation (2). All of the coefficients have their expected signs, although only the first three coefficients are statistically significant at an acceptable confidence level. The INT variable is negatively related to the dependent variable, which is consistent with an interpretation of EXCESS as reflecting a lower quality of health care under public plans. Although, it is difficult to explain the strong negative INT coefficient, it is inconsistent with an interpretation of EXCESS as reflecting a higher demand for publicly funded health care because of superior performance of the sector. The MIX and EXCESS variables are statistically significant at the .05 level. The INT variable is significant at the .10 level (two-tailed). The F-ratio is significant at the .10 level. A partial F-test confirms that the additional variables included in equation (2) One should, perhaps, not draw strong conclusions from equation (2), given the small number of degrees of freedom and the relatively low F-ratio; however, it does seem fair to conclude that there is no persuasive evidence that higher earlierperiod values of public health care financing as a share of total health care financing encourage a faster relative growth of government health care expenditures. Table 4 The other relationship of interest is that between cost inflation and the mix of financing. If higher ratios of public to total funding result in lower health care inflation, the relative amount of public health care funding identified in the GRO variable implies a higher real value of output. The dependent inflation variable, PRICE, is defined as the excess of the average annual percentage change in the health care price deflator minus the average annual percentage change in the total domestic price deflator over the period 1980 through 1990. 25 It seems preferable to net out general inflationary factors from the relevant dependent variable for two reasons. First, health care is a significant component of the total domestic price deflator. Hence, regressing of the health care component of the domestic price deflator against the overall domestic price deflator would contribute to a simultaneity bias. Second, the domestic price deflator variable would likely dominate the estimating equation in terms of its contribution to identification. However, the general inflation variable is not of particular interest in this context. The main independent variable of interest is, again, MIX--in this case defined as the public percentage of total expenditures on health in 1980. 26 Equation (3) in Table 4 reports the results of regressing PRICE on MIX. The latter has a statistically significant negative coefficient. The F-ratio is also statistically significant at the .05 level.
Discussion of Equation (3) in

Discussion of Equation 4 in Table 4
Equation (3) provides support for the hypothesis that a concentration of funding in public schemes mitigates inflationary pressures in the health care sector. However, it is important to assess whether this result is robust to the inclusion of other possible determinants of health care price changes in equation (4). Several variables seem relevant to consider in this regard. One is the specific mix of health care expenditures. For example, over the period 1980 through 1990, the price index for pharmaceuticals increased at a slower rate than the overall hospital 25 Data limitations prevent an exact duplication of the time period used in equations (1) Another characteristic of the health care system is the potential to substitute lower cost treatments for higher cost treatments. One important example is the increasing substitution of outpatient care for inpatient care. We have no direct measure of the extent to which such substitution takes place in this sample of OECD countries. However, the opportunity to engage in such substitution is presumably greater the smaller the ratio of outpatient to total patient care at the start of the period. Hence, another independent variable, INPAT, was included. This is defined as expenditures on in-patient care as a percent of total health care expenditures in 1980.
Differences across countries in the supply elasticities of key production factors should also condition PRICE. In the absence of direct supply elasticity estimates for physicians, the PHYS variable (defined for 1980) is used as a proxy. PHYS is defined as the number of physicians per 1,000 residents. We assume that the higher the value of PHYS, the greater the supply elasticity of physicians, as physicians are more likely to supply additional services at constant prices when they are in more abundant supply. The estimation of PRICE as a function of MIX, PHARM, INPAT, and PHYS is reported as equation (4). The PHARM and MIX coefficients are statistically significant at the .05 level, while the PHYS coefficient is significant at the .10 level. All coefficients have the expected negative signs, and the PHARM, INPAT, and PHYS variables are jointly statistically significant. The F-ratio is significant at the .05 level. Thus, equation (4) provides somewhat weaker evidence than equation 3 for the inflation-mitigating properties of publicly financed health care. Table 4 As might be anticipated, the United States has the highest value for PRICE (2.7) compared to an average value for the entire sample of around 0.7. The United States also has the lowest value of MIX. Hence, the estimation results for MIX are likely to be extremely sensitive to the U.S. health care experience. This is confirmed in equation (5), which deletes the United States from the sample. Here the MIX variable is statistically insignificant. The magnitudes of the other 27 Over the period 1980 through 1990, the pharmaceutical-specific inflation rate (i.e., the excess of pharmaceutical price increases over those on all goods and services) was zero for the total of OECD countries. The hospital-specific inflation rate was 1.1 percent over the same period (OECD 1993, p. 29). coefficients are relatively unchanged, while the coefficients for PHYS and INPAT become more significant. The F-ratio remains significant at the .05 level.
Discussion of Equation (5) in
In sum, once other influences on health care specific inflation rates are controlled for, funding mix is statistically insignificant. Viewing health care specific inflation rates as imprecise proxies for differences in efficiency across countries in the delivery of health care services suggests that the overall efficiency of the health care sector is not influenced in any important way by the mix of funding, at least over a range of funding mix that characterizes the OECD countries other than the United States.
The problems in equating efficiency changes to health care-specific inflation rates are well known. Specifically, there are well known biases in health care specific inflation rates (Newhouse, 1992) . The issue is whether the biases are likely to be systematically related to the mix of health care funding. It is only possible to speculate on this issue. A plausible speculation is that the calculated health care specific inflation rate is likely to have a greater upward bias in the case of the United States than for other countries in the sample. The reason is the strikingly more intensive use of new technology in the U.S. health care system (Battista, et. al., 1992) . A faster rate of introduction of new products and procedures into medical care is certainly associated with some quality change. Ignoring quality change will lead to an overstatement of inflation. Deleting the United States from the sample arguably, therefore, mitigates any systematic bias to the MIX coefficient in the PRICE equations owing to upward biases in the estimated health care specific inflation rate. Linking this finding back to the earlier results further suggests that the nominal rates of growth of public health care expenditure used to define the GRO variable are not more or less representative of real rates of growth depending upon the mix of financing. In particular, there is no reason to believe that a given value for GRO represents a higher value of the (unobserved) relative growth of real health care expenditures in countries with relatively high values for the MIX variable. 28
CONCLUSION
This study examines whether private financing erodes public support for maintaining (or increasing) nominal health care budgets in the public sector. It also examines the hypothesis that private financing reduces the real value of nominal government health care budgets by contributing to higher health care costs.
On balance, these results provide little support for arguments that private financing contributes to reduced access to publicly financed health care. If anything, they provide support for the view that attempts to restrict the availability of private financing will erode support for a public plan that is operating with excess demand. This conclusion may appear to be at odds with studies showing that differences in access to health care are smaller when public funding is a larger share of total funding van Doorslaer and Wagstaff, 1992) . In fact, our argument is that this result may not obtain under specific circumstances; namely, when governments cut back public funding while attempting to constrain opportunities for private spending, thereby creating excess demand and related quality degradation.
It might be argued that the adverse impacts of private financing would appear only at relatively high levels of private to total financing. However, this hypothesis is unsupported by historical evidence. Specifically, publicly financed health care in most developed countries was introduced into environments characterized by an almost total reliance upon private health care financing. Over time, public provision came to dominate, or completely displace, private insurance schemes. 29 The suggestion that higher ratios of private financing imply higher overall costs of health care also receives little historical support. Most supporters of the argument cite the United States as an illustration of the adverse cost consequences of privately financed health care. While there is no gainsaying that U.S. health care cost increases have outpaced those of other countries, it can be argued that costs accelerated sharply after the introduction of the major federal government programs Medicare and Medicaid. As well, U.S. health care specific inflation rates may be particularly overstated by a failure to control for quality, including speed of access to services.
In a controversial policy area such as health care, it is prudent to offer cautious policy recommendations. This is particularly true in a context where basic data on inflation and real output are subject to even more potential biases than is the case for many other sectors of the economy. These results argue in favor of allowing more privately financed health care, on the margin, as an important supplement to public provision.
